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1.0 Introduction  
The chapter challenges the commonly held notion in the capabilities approach, arising out 
of over emphasis on path dependency, that capability development follows a single path 
dependent route, which is determined positively by interrelatedness among existing 
technologies. It queries the fascination especially within the empirical literature with 
examining a single, successful choice. The chapter argues, like Penrose (1959) and Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994), that a firm seldom considers only one strategic capability 
development route. Often, a route is chosen from a bounded option set, anchored by the 
µGR- QRWKLQJ¶GHIDXOW7KLVLVVXSSRUWHGE\empirical case evidence, which also suggests 
that, in some instances, technological interrelatedness is not a major factor influencing the 
development of capabilities from the available options.  
The chapter is structured into five sections: The first section reviews key literature 
in the capabilities approach (i.e. Barney 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) and 
GHVFULEHVKRZLQDQDWWHPSWWRµHQJDJH¶ZLWKKLVWRU\SDWKGHSHQGHQF\KDVSOD\HGDFHQtral 
role in its theoretical construct. It than argues that an attempt by strategy researchers to 
HTXDWHµVHULRXV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKKLVWRU\E\XVLQJRQO\WKHQRWLRQRISDWKGHSHQGHQF\is 
highly erroneous. In particular, three issues of concern are identified, namely, a myopia in 
strategic choice, causal bias and, efficiency assumption.  
The second section reviews how historians have addressed these problems, with a 
view to incorporate these suggestions into an empirical study. A key historicist technique 
is to examine the multiple options that were available before a particular alternative was 
decided upon and to identify reasons why the others were not pursued. The resulting 
implications for the capabilities approach are two fold: first, there is a need to acknowledge 
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the presence of various capability options available to the firm and; second, to also examine 
why a capability option (i.e. the Road Less Travelled) ZDVµQRW¶SXUVXHG (here the emphasis 
is on juxtaposing alternatives and inductively identifying historical events and factors that 
led to selection of one option over the others) as opposed to a sole focus upon why an 
RSWLRQµZDV¶SXUVXHGKHUHWKHHPSKDVLVLVVROHO\RQWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRISDWKGHSHQGHQF\
and its underlying features e.g., technological interrelatedness, increasing returns, 
dominant logic etc, associated with the successful choice).  
The third section uses this theoretical suggestion to examine capability 
development in the Dundee Jute Industry (DJI). It addresses the three major concerns with 
path dependency, illustrating them from the archival-based case studies of firms in the DJI 
between 1880 and 1970. This phase is divided into three parts: period 1 (1880s-1890s), 
period 2 (1919-1939), and period 3 (1945-1970). During the first period firms in the 
industry began to first formulate capability development alternatives, whereas during the 
second and third period the different options were employed. The section then reflects on 
the strategic response of the DJI to the growing competition from the Indian industry since 
WKHODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\DQGWKHLQGXVWU\¶VGHFOLQHLQJHQHUDO  
The fourth section underlines the major findings of the research and emphasises 
their importance for theoretical development in the capabilities literature. The role of path 
dependency has been acknowledged also in influencing organisational foresight. Hence, 
this section outlines key implications arising out of the empirical case for research on 
organisational foresight.  
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2.0 Path Dependency and Application of History in Capabilities Approach  
2.1 Path dependency and Strategic Capabilities 
The significance of path dependency in resource commitment was established by David 
DQG$UWKXU'DYLGDUJXHGWKDWLQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHµORJLFRULOOogic 
ZRUOGDURXQGXV¶LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRXQGHUVWDQGµKRZLWJRWWKDWZD\¶S+HH[DPLQHG
WKHFDVHRIWKHFRQWLQXHGSUHIHUHQFHRIWKHµ4:(57<¶RYHUWKHµ'6.¶IRUPDWIRUVHWWLQJ
keys on typewriters and computers, when it was demonstrated that the latter form was more 
efficient than the former. He argued that the combination of three conditions led to this 
preference:  first, the technical interrelatedness of system components, such as typists and 
keyboards; second, increasing returns, as in the greater value of keyboard systems with 
larger market shares; and third, quasi-irreversibility of investment, as in the costs of 
switching from one keyboard system to another owing to µlearning and habituation¶ (p. 
336). Building on this framework, Arthur emphasized the importance of increasing returns 
of scale that developed over time and suggested that these can be derived from both the 
demand and supply-side. On the supply side the result of learning effects (learning by doing 
or learning by using), which lower the cost or improve the quality of a product. On the 
demand side, increasing returns can occur owing to positive network externalities, which 
raise the value of a product or technique for each user as the total number of user increases.  
The notion of path dependency has played an important role in building the 
theoretical pillars of the resource-based view (RBV), the intellectual root of the capabilities 
approach. However, the primary aim has been to incorporate history within its framework.  
Distinguishing the RBV approach from that of the industrial organization (IO) 
perspectives, Barney (1991) pointed out that the proponents of latter approach examined a 
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ILUP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LQGHSHQGHQW RI LWV KLVWRU\ S  ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKLV WKH 5%9
framework gave due importance to the role of history in its analysis. In particular, it played 
DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ HQVXULQJ WKH µLPSHUIHFW LQLPLWDELOLW\¶ RI UHVRXUFHV WKURXJK µSDWK-
GHSHQGHQF\¶ 
³WKLVDSSURDFKDVVHUWVWKDWQRWRQO\DUHILUPVLQWULQVLFDOO\KLVWRULFDODQG
social entities, but their ability to acquire and exploit some resources 
depends upon their place in time and space. Once this particular unique 
time in history passes, firms that do not have space- and time- dependent 
resources cannot obtain them, and thus these resources are imperfectly 
LPLWDEOH´S-108). 
Hence, the role of contextual history in creating path-dependency has been 
important for researchers examining firm capabilities. As Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) 
QRWHG µWKH QRWLRQ RI SDWK-GHSHQGHQF\ UHFRJQL]HV WKDW KLVWRU\ PDWWHUV¶ S  3DWK-
dependency plays an important role in determining the nature of the capabilities that a firm 
is able to develop, thus limiting what it can do and where it can go in the future. As Teece 
HWDODUJXHGDILUP¶VµSUHYLRXVLQYHVWPHQWVDQGUHSHUWRLUHRIURXWLQHVLWVKLVWRU\FRQVWUDLQ
LWVIXWXUHEHKDYLRU¶S 
Consequently, the focus in empirical studies, when historical analysis is conducted, 
has been upon the examination of causes that lead to the path-dependent nature of 
capabilities at both the industry and firm levels. For example, Klepper and Simons (2000), 
studied the American television receiver industry from 1945-1989, using a statistically 
sophisticated model of industry evolution. They found that greater experience in the radio 
industry acted positively on firm entry and the sustaining of competitive advantage in the 
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television industry, thus indicating that existing capabilities help determine successful 
entry to new related markets. Similarly, Langlois and Steinmuller (2000) studied the 
history of the American semiconductor industry from 1980-1995. They examined the 
LQGXVWU\¶VJHQHUDOUHVSRQVe to the Japanese challenge during this period and found that, 
although some new capabilities were developed, firms relied heavily on the capabilities 
that had been developed in the earlier periods, thereby emphasising the importance of 
existing technology in determining the nature of capability evolution in the face of 
international competition.   
Studies at firm level gave relatively greater emphasis to the examination of the 
historical context, especially within the firm. Nonetheless, their primary aim was to 
establish path-dependency. For example, Tripsas and Gauetti (2000) examined the 
company history of Polaroid from its inception in 1937 to 1990, with particular attention 
to the period from 1980-90, in order to study the relationship between capabilities, 
cognition and leadership. They found that investment in developing a particular capability 
was closely related to the dominant belief pattern of its leadership. With the change in 
OHDGHUVKLSFDPHDFKDQJHLQWKHOHDGHU¶VFRJQLWLYHEHOLHIVZKLFKLQWXrn led the direction 
for developing a particular capability. Similarly, Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell and Klepper 
(2000) used a case-study approach to examine the company histories of four firms within 
the American semiconductor industry. They found that each LQGLYLGXDOILUP¶VFRPPLWPHQW
to technology and the ability to integrate research and manufacturing were the two major 
aspects in determining heterogeneity of capabilities and developing unique path-
dependency. Consequently, the latter played an instrumental role in the way capabilities 
were developed in these firms. However, as will be discussed in the next section, this 
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approach to history in the capabilities literature has been questioned by scholars who have 
called for a greater attention to history in the strategy literature.  
 
2.2 Concerns with Path Dependency  
Researchers have argued that an over emphasis on path dependency has been the result of 
DµQDUURZSHUVSHFWLYH¶RIKLVWRU\LQWKHVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQWOLWHUDWXUH%RRWK
Clark and Rowlinson, 2004). Although path dependency has made a valuable contribution 
in terms of fortifying the theoretical underpinnings of the capability approach, it has also 
led to concerns among researchers resulting from its treatment of history. Booth (2003) 
and Clark and Rowlinson (2004) have identified three major areas of concern relating 
especially to the capabilities literature.  
First, a major implication of path dependency in terms of capability development 
LVµORFNLQ¶HIIHFW$VFXUUHQWFDSDELOLWLHVDUHFRnsidered a result of past investments and 
future capability developments are a result of current investments, the focus has been on 
H[DPLQLQJIDFWRUVWKDWOHDGWRWKHµORFNLQ¶DIRUPRIGHWHUPLQLVPVXFKDVWHFKQRORJLFDO
interrelatedness, dominant logic and so on, which determine the development of the 
existing capabilities. Path dependency often underplays the significance of alternatives 
available in history, present, and in future. On the other hand, a distinct theoretical 
contribution of resource/capabilities approach has been to recognise and underline the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIPDQDJHPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR OHYHUDJH WKHLU H[LVWLQJ UHVRXUFHFDSDELOLWLHV LQWR
multiple strategic possibilities (Penrose 1959; Hamel and Prahalad 1994). This is also 
reflected in practice, where managers often consider more than one option before 
committing to any particular strategy. Therefore, by giving greater attention to path 
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dependency related issues, empirical studies have often underplayed the importance 
attributed to strategic options within the theoretical framework. Second, path dependency 
gives particular emphasis to specific decisions, turning points and events in history that led 
WRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFXUUHQWFDSDELOLWLHV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHµIOX[FRQWLQXDOFULVLVDQG
dilemma¶ZLWKLQKLVWRU\DUHRIWHQXQGHUSOD\HGLQWKHHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVThird, in economics, 
where it was originally applied, the notion of path dependency recognises the inefficiencies 
in strategic choices as a result of lock-in effects of technological interrelatedness. In 
strategy, some researchers have made an attempt to theoretically examine this aspect, 
HVSHFLDOO\ WKURXJK QRWLRQV VXFK DV µFRUH ULJLGLWLHV¶   DQG µVWUDWHJLF OLDELOLWLHV¶ $UHQG
2004). Yet, within the empirical literature, researchers have to a large extent assumed that 
the capabilities that are developed as a result of technological interrelatedness are efficient 
strategy formulations.  
To summarise, the notion of path dependency has been an integral part of the 
theoretical construct of the capabilities approach. Researchers have it mainly to assert the 
importance of history. In particular, it has helped to underline the uniqueness of a 
resource/capability, which is specific to a particular firm, thus helping it to maintain its 
distinctive advantage over competitors. As a result, empirical studies have devoted their 
efforts to establish the path dependency of a capability by examining the role of 
determining factors such as technological inter-relatedness in selection of the successful 
choice. However, an over emphasis on this aspect has led researchers, especially in 
empirical studies, to underplay an original tenet of the capabilities approach, i.e. the 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRFUDIWPXOWLSOHVWUDWHJLFRSWLRQVIURPH[LVWLQJUHVRXUFHFDSDELOLWLHV 
This has resulted in an exclusive analysis of critical turning events and an unqualified 
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assumption that the capability developed as a result of interrelatedness is an efficient 
strategy. The next section examines how these issues can be overcome through greater 
engagement with the history literature.  
 
3.0 Historicist Approach to Countering Path dependency  
One way to counter the problems of path dependency as discussed above is to give greater 
attention to the historical context and highlight the multiplicity of choices that were 
available before a particular course of action had been decided. Usually, firms consider 
more than one strategic capability development option before they chose a specific one. 
Therefore, attention should be given to identifying the options that were under 
consideration and underline why certain options were not pursued. Historians (e.g. Elton 
1967 and Carr 1964) have pointed out the importance of this aspect.  
 For Elton (1967), history is an examination of events in the past that have left 
deposits in the present. It deals with the happenings, changes and particulars of the events 
tKDWRFFXUUHGLQWKHSDVWS+HQFHWKHVWXG\RIKLVWRU\DPRXQWVWRDµVHDUFKIRUWUXWK¶
FRQFHUQLQJWKHVHLQFLGHQWVS,QWKLVHQGHDYRUDµSURIHVVLRQDO¶KLVWRULDQ¶VDLPLVWR
JHWFORVHUWRWKHSDVWDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKHFKDUDFWHUVµXQWLORQHNQRws what they are going 
WRVD\QH[W¶S:KLOHUHFUHDWLQJWKLVSDVWWKHGHWHUPLQLVWWHQGHQFLHVZKLFKDULVHIURP
DUHVHDUFKHU¶VDLPWRMXVWLI\DUHVHDUFKHU¶VSUHFRQFHLYHGWKHRULHVPXVWEHDYRLGHGS-
(OWRQDUJXHGWKDWDOWKRXJKVRPHIRUPRIµSDWWHUQPDNLQJ¶PD\EHQHFHVVDU\WRSXW
IRUZDUGDQH[SODQDWLRQ WKHDLPVKRXOGEH WRKLJKOLJKW WKHµPXOWLIDULRXVDQGSDUWLFXODU¶
nature of events (p. 128).  
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 On the other hand, for Carr (1964), the essence of history is in the interpretation of 
the past as opposed to the pursuit of truth. Carr questioned the over dependence on 
documents as a source through which to give accurate accounts of historical events. He 
argued that the content recorded in documents often depended on what the recorder thought 
had happened, or what he wanted others to think had happened (p. 13). As a result, the 
interpretation that the historian derives from the records carries greater weight. In order to 
DUULYHDWDSODXVLEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHKLVWRULDQLVUHTXLUHGWRJDLQµFRQWDFWwith the mind 
RIWKRVHDERXWZKRPKHLVZULWLQJ¶S&DUUDOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDWKLVWRU\LVDERXWWKH
JHQHUDODVRSSRVHGWRWKHSDUWLFXODUSDUJXLQJWKDWKLVWRU\LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKµUHODWLRQ¶
between the unique and the general, rather then the precedence of one over the other (p. 
65). He acknowledged that in the quest for generalisation, the historian might be faced with 
the charge of being deterministic (p. 85). However, he questioned the notion that there were 
OLPLWOHVV SRVVLELOLWLHV DW RQH¶V GLVSRsal (p. 87). Every human action is both free and 
determined to a certain extent (p. 89). Carr quelled the charge of determinism by suggesting 
that researchers sometimes use rhetorical language to label an event as an inevitable when 
they want to underline the point that a set of factors would make the likelihood of its 
RFFXUUHQFHDV µRYHUZKHOPLQJO\VWURQJ¶ S <HWKHDFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW LQSUDFWLFH
historians are aware of fluxes created by the alternative course of actions that were being 
considered by the actors:  
 
³,QSUDFWLFHKLVWRULDQVGRQRWDVVXPHWKDWHYHQWVDUHLQHYLWDEOHEHIRUHWKH\
have taken place. They frequently discuss alternative courses available to the 
actors in the story on the assumption that the option was open, though they 
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go on quite correctly to explain why one course was eventually chosen over 
WKHRWKHU´S 
 
 Notably, Carr did not consider it a high priority to further explore the range of 
RSWLRQVWKDWZHUHXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ+HOHIWWKLVMREWRµSRHWVDQGPHWDSK\VLFLDQV¶S
 1HYHUWKHOHVV LW LV FOHDU WKDW KLVWRULDQV IURP ERWK µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ DQG µSRVW-PRGHUQ¶
schools have recognized the presence of multiple options prior to the selection of a course 
of action. Indeed, the examination of multiple options has received greater attention by 
historians practicing counterfactual analysis. In underlining the need to examine the 
various alternatives that were available, Trevor-Roper (1981) argued:  
 
³$WDQ\JLYHQPRPHQW LQKLVWRU\ WKHUH DUH UHDO DOWHUQDWLYHV«+RZFDQZH
explain what happened and why if we only look at what happened and never 
consider the alternatives, the total pattern of forces whose pressure created the 
HYHQW"´S 
  
 But not all historians have been receptive to the idea of counterfactual analysis. For 
LQVWDQFH&DUUWHUPHGWKHPHWKRGDVEHLQJDNLQWRDµSDUORUJDPH¶S$PDMRU
REMHFWLRQKDVEHHQWKDWFRXQWHUIDFWXDODQDO\VLVUHOLHVRQµIDFWVZKLFKFRQFHGHGO\QHYHU
H[LVWHG¶)HUJXVRQ,QRUGHUWRFRXQWHUWKLV)HUJXVRQVXJJHVWHGWhat researchers 
VKRXOGFRQVLGHUSODXVLEOHRSWLRQVDVµWKRVHDOWHUQDWLYHVZKLFKFDQEHVKRZQRQWKHEDVLV
RIFRQWHPSRUDU\HYLGHQFHWKDWFRQWHPSRUDULHVDFWXDOO\FRQVLGHUHG¶S 
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 Arguably, the use of history to establish path dependency only as an element within 
its theoretical construct would leave it short of fulfilling the potential that researchers have 
expected from its use. For example, when Helfat (2000) cautioned strategy researchers by 
citing the American philosopher George Santayana who remarNHG µWhose who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it¶DQG7HHFHHWDODUJXHGWKDWµKLVWRU\
PDWWHUV¶WKHUH was an implicit call for greater attention to the prevailing historical context 
and the available alternatives. Theoretically, in order to avoid repeating history (assuming 
that events and lessons indicate issues that are not worth repeating), the first step would be 
a closer examination of various alternatives that were available during the historical 
context, so as to be able to make a judgment on exactly what to avoid.  
 This study examines the strategic options as a means of addressing the three major 
problems associated with path dependency identified in the earlier section. It does not aim 
to conduct a detailed counterfactual analysis of strategy options. Its focus is on the 
identification of the various strategic capability development options available to firms 
within a specified and localized industry and to examine why they were not pursued. Of 
course, it is possible that a capability developed by a firm may reflect path dependency. 
However, initial identification of the option set allows an examination of why a particular 
capability was developed over the others and highlights the problems or barriers faced in 
pursuing the rejected options. In addition, by taking this approach, a greater understanding 
of the historical context is created and a better assessment of the influence of path 
dependency is possible.  
 Using this framework, the following sections describe the development of 
technological capabilities in the DJI between the late nineteenth century and 1970, in order 
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to counter the growing international competition. In particular, it identifies the strategic 
options available to firms and the capabilities that were actually developed by four firms1- 
Buist Spinning, Jute Industries (JI), Scott & Fyfe (S&F) and Craiks - between period 2 and 
period 3.  It also identifies factors, which led to selection of one capability development 
option over the other.   
 
4.0 The Dundee Jute Industry  
Like cotton, jute is a natural fibre. It is grown primarily in the Indian sub-continent, 
especially in the eastern Indian state of Bengal and Bangladesh. To this day, this region 
VXSSOLHVWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VGHPDQGIRUUDZMXWH,WV cultivation is confined to this 
region owing to the climatic conditions that are particularly suitable for growing this crop. 
Although jute was spun and woven by handlooms in India for over two thousand years, it 
was in Dundee, Scotland, where modern production techniques were first introduced that 
enabled the industry to achieve its worldwide reputation.  
Historically, textile firms in Dundee had used Russian flax as their primary fibre. 
Jute was introduced in Dundee in the 1820s and 1830s. Initially, the flax manufacturers 
were not keen to use jute because it was considered an inferior option to flax (Woodhouse 
and Brand 1934). However, the sudden cessation in the supply of flax from Russia during 
the Crimean War (1854-1856) left little room for this resistance. Jute provided a cheaper 
option to flax and the customers also accepted it. Thus, using modern production 
techniques, the DJI was born. With little international competition, it soon emerged as the 
                                                 
1 The primary criteria that governed the selection of cases was the availability of relevant archival data. The 
case studies represent the cross-section of the industry during this period, in terms of size (small and large), 
and focus (specialised and generalised). Buist: Small and specialising in spinning. Craiks: Small and 
specialising in weaving. S&F: Small and specialising in weaving. Jute Industries: Large and generalised.  
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leading global supplier of jute goods.  The industry continued its growth over the second 
part of the nineteenth century due to both its global monopoly on supply and to a large 
demand for sand bags during the American Civil War (1861-65) (Carrie 1953). The 
quantity of imported raw jute gives an indication of the rapid growth of the industry during 
this period (see Figure 1). Correspondingly, the number of spindles, looms and people 
employed in the industry expanded significantly (see Table 1).  
 
 
                 Figure 1: Source: Howe (1982) 
 
 
    
Table 1 Number of Spindles, Looms and Employed  
                       between 1870-1890 
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 Spindles Looms Employed 
1870 94,520 3774 14911 
1890 268,165 14107 43366 
            Source: Jute Working Party Report (1946) 
 
 
4.1 The Rise of Indian Competition and Contraction of the Dundee Jute Industry  
Like the UK cotton industry, the jute industry witnessed a dramatic decline from the end 
of the nineteenth century. By 1944, raw jute imports into the UK had collapsed to less than 
RIWKHLUOHYHOV6HH)LJXUHDQGWKHVHFWRU¶VVL]HUDQNLQJKDGIallen to third in 
the world.  
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Figure 2: Source: Jute Working Party Report (1946)  
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The major challenge facing the jute industry up to late nineteenth century was the 
closing of traditional markets in Europe due to imposition of import tariffs and, more 
importantly, the rise of competition from the Indian industry. As with the case of 
continental European countries, tariffs were also imposed by India on the import of jute 
goods. By 1869, this duty was 7 ½ %.2 There was a feeling within the Dundee industry that 
this was less to do with collection of revenue for the state government and more to do with 
protecting the growing industry in India.3 As a result, attempts were made to repeal them 
by making representations to the Indian government directly4 and later to the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons on the Indian finances.5 7KH LQGXVWU\¶V SHWLWLRQ
appeared to have been heard as the tariffs were soon removed.6 Nonetheless, by the 1890s, 
the Indian industry had expanded rapidly. By 1882, it had 21 mills, with a total of 5655 
looms and 91,000 spindles. And by 1892, the number of mills had increased to 26, with 
8101 looms and 162,000 spindles.7 Hence, growth of competition from the Indian industry 
was very rapid.   
The dramatic growth of the Indian industry was due to the cost advantage that it 
enjoyed over the Dundee industry. This advantage was a result of three major aspects: a) 
the Indian industry enjoyed a lower cost of raw material as it was closer to the jute growing 
region. This closeness eliminated the shipping cost that Dundee had to incur to import jute; 
                                                 
2 DCC Minute Book 31st March 1869 
3 Ibid  
4 DCC Minute Book 30th March 1870  
5 29th March 1871  
6 3rd September 1874 
7 DYB 1892, pp 87 
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b) the Indian industry also enjoyed the benefit of longer working hours. The extended 
working hours meant increased production and reduced cost of production owing to 
economies of scale. While average working time in Dundee was 56 hours per week, the 
Indian industry clocked up to 84 hours a week, with an average of 72 hours a week8; c) the 
third major advantage stemmed from the lower exchange rate. The monetary instability in 
the world markets resulting from the demonetisation of silver had devalued the Indian 
currency significantly.  For example, an estimate by the Secretary of the Dundee Chamber 
RI&RPPHUFHLQLQGLFDWHGWKDWµZLWKWKH5XSHHDWGD&DOFXWWDPLOOFRuld earn a 
profit of 20 Rupees per ton where a Dundee mill would simply pay expenses, and with the 
rupee at 12d the profit to the Indian mill would increase to about 53 Rupees, or some 50 
SHUFHQW¶9 
 By the mid-1870s, the industry in Dundee found itself squeezed between two sides. 
First, the growth in the Indian industry challenged the DJI in major international markets 
such as United Sates, South America, Asia, and Australia and second, high continental 
European tariffs made it difficult to access major local markets and also gave rise to the 
growth of industries within these countries.  The consequent capacity increase led directly 
to an excess of global supply with concomitant effects on price. The DJI had to develop a 
strategic response or face collapse. Its extant capabilities formed the basis for its reaction. 
The next section describes key capabilities in jute manufacturing.  
 
4.2 Capabilities in Jute Manufacturing    
                                                 
8 DYB 1894, pp 96 
9 DCC Minute Book 27th September 1894  
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Like any textile industry using natural fibre, there are three major phases in jute 
manufacturing: preparation (assorting of raw jute), spinning (making yarn) and weaving 
(making cloth). Similarly, like any textile industry, jute manufacturing had two major 
products, yarn and cloth.  
In weaving, capabilities can be categorised as the ability to make different widths, 
lengths, and weights of cloth. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the different combination of widths 
and weights required to manufacture a certain type of yarn and cloth. For example, 
narrower width and relatively heavier cloth was suitable for the traditional sacking and 
bagging. On the other hand, lighter weight and narrow-width cloth was suitable for scrim 
cloth, which can be used, in the building industry. However, a wider-width and lightweight 
cloth is required for linoleum, wall coverings and carpet backing. In yarn, the weight was 
the major determinant. While the heavier counts went into making sacks and bags, the 
lighter ones were required for woven carpet yarns. Therefore, the variation in the width 
DQGZHLJKWVLQFORWKDQG\DUQVDOVRKHOSHGDILUP¶VHQWU\LQWRQHZPDUNHWV 
 
      
Table 2 Yarn and Cloth Categories  
Yarns Lbs 
Fine Up to 6 
Medium 7 ± 16 
Heavy 16 ± 48 
Rove 46 ± 1000 
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Cloth  Inch 
Narrow  Upto 56 
Medium  57 ± 68  
Wide  69 and above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Major Yarn and Cloth: Type, Product and Markets  
 Lbs Width (Inch) Weight (Oz- 
Ounce) 
Yarn    
Fine 1.75 to 3 - - 
Carpet Warp 3.5 to 6 - - 
Hessian Warp 7 to 9 - - 
Sacking Warp 8 to 10 - - 
Hessian Weft 7 to 12 - - 
Carpet Weft 14 to 24 - - 
    
Cloth     
Sacking  - 22 to 30 11 to 24 
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Tarpaulin and Canvas - 36 to 45 14 to 20 
Hessian - 22 to 80 5 to 14 
Scrim - 28 to 80 5 to 20 
Linoleum Backing  - 72 to 84 5 to 9 
Carpet Backing  - 150 to 210 5 to 9 
Wall Covering  - 40 to 145 8 to 10.5 
 
   
 
However, manufacturing cloth of wider widths and yarn of finer qualities required 
a slightly different process and skills than that required for traditional narrow width cloth 
and heavy yarns. The traditional looms suitable for making sack and bag cloth were of 
narrow widths. They could be customized to produce wider width and long length cloth 
using internal engineering knowledge on existing machines. Traditionally, the machineries 
for jute manufacturing, including the drawing machine, spinning frames, looms and 
ancillary parts, were provided by specialised engineering firms. Internal engineering 
knowledge enables textile firms to make alterations on their own in order to make yarn and 
cloth of particular weight and width. These engineering skills acted also as an important 
supporting capability in developing capability in the wide-widths, long lengths and the 
introduction of new fibre, especially polypropylene. Hence, although a purpose built 
machine can be bought at market prices from a specialised engineering firm, if a textile 
firm possesses internal engineering skills, it can carry out modifications to existing 
machines to enable new fibre adoption faster than rivals and so develop new product, or 
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adapt existing product, at much lower cost. In spinning, the capability takes the form of 
µFRXQWV¶ ZKLFK DUH EURDGO\ FDWHJRULVHG LQWR ILQH PHGLXP DQG KHDY\ 7KH )LJXUH 
illustrates capabilities in the spinning and weaving section of the jute industry.  
The following two sections describe how firms within the industry used these 
capabilities to reposition themselves against the growing international competition 
between late nineteenth century and 1970.    
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 'XQGHH¶V 6WUDWHJLF 5HSRVLWLRQLQJ DQG &DSDELOLW\ 2SWLRQV GXULQJ WKH ODWH
Nineteenth Century 
In order to meet the challenge of growing international competition, the DJI tried to 
UHSRVLWLRQ LWVHOI VWUDWHJLFDOO\ LQ WKH ODWH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ 7KH LQGXVWU\¶V HIIRUWV ZHUH
guided by the idea of competing in areas where the Indian manufacturers would not able 
to challenge them. In order to do so, two major strategic capability development options 
were being considered within the industry. 
 
First, there was a move to develop capabilities where the Indian industry could not 
compete. The basis of this argument was that workers in Dundee possessed superior skills 
in the spinning of yarn and the manufacturing of cloth, with which it was perceived that 
the Indian workers were not capable of developing. By leveraging their skills, the Dundee 
manufacturers could develop specialised and higher-class goods, which would fetch them 
better margins. Particular attention was given to the development of products for the 
linoleum and carpet industries. In addition, it was also felt that closer contacts with the 
customers weUHQHHGHGLQRUGHUWRGHYHORSµVSHFLDOW\¶SURGXFWV  These fine and specialty 
products soon provided advantages to Dundee firms. For instance, although the trade was 
bad during 1892, the specialty products recorded a particularly good turnover over normal 
types.  
The efforts to focus on developing specialised products culminated in the 
establishment of a Technical School in 1888. It was hoped that besides teaching essential 
engineering skills for operating spinning and weaving machines, the institute would help 
in developing valuable skills in textile designs.  The suggestion for a technical institute 
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appears to have first emerged in the mid-1880s. When a question was asked by the Royal 
&RPPLVVLRQDERXW'XQGHH¶VHIIRUWV WRGHDOZLWKJURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPpetition, the 
Dundee Chamber of Commerce could offer no suggestions except point towards the fact 
WKDWDµJUHDWGHDORIPRQH\ZDVLQYHVWHGLQPDFKLQHU\LQ'XQGHHDQGWKDWLWZDVGLIILFXOW
WRDOWHULW¶$VXJJHVWLRQZDVPDGHWRGLYHUVLI\IURPMXWHE\SURYLding the example of how 
the ribbon industry in Coventry went into making bicycles after the tariff on French ribbons 
ZDVUHSHDOHGLQ+RZHYHUQRWDOOILUPVZHUHSUHSDUHGWRPDNHDµMXPSRIWKDWVRUW¶
A technical institute, on the other hand, would help the industry to cultivate specialised 
skills in jute that were necessary to develop capabilities to meet the growing competition.  
Although there was a general consensus within the industry that it was important to 
develop capabilities in areas where the Indian industry could not compete, there was always 
a lingering threat that the Indian manufacturers would soon catch-up with Dundee in 
whatever superior capabilities it developed. This was due to the relative technological 
simplicity in jute manufacturing.   
Second, attempts were made to develop capabilities in new fibres. This was driven 
by the realization that any development within jute would soon be adopted by the Indian 
industry. By the 1890s, the DJI had become proactive in their search for alternate fibres. In 
his address to the industry, the local MP, Sir John Leng, acknowledged that if 
PDQXIDFWXUHUVµGHYHORSWKHXWPRVWILQHUFODVVRIJRRGVDQGDLPDWVXSSO\LQJWKHVSHFLDOWLHV
ZKLFK WKH PDUNHWV RI WKH ZRUOG FRQWLQXDOO\ UHTXLUH¶ WKH\ FRXOG PHHW the challenge of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQ+HDOVRXUJHGWKHPWREHRQDFRQVWDQWVHDUFKIRUµQHZYDULHWLHV
DQG QHZ FRPELQDWLRQ RI PDWHULDOV SDWWHUQV DQG ILQLVK¶  6XJJHVWLQJ WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
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exploring Rhea, a fibre that he had come across on his visit to Asia, he had the following 
suggestion for the industry:  
 
³«WKH PDQLSXODWLRQ RI 5KHD ZKLFK KDV JUHDW SRVVLELOLWLHV DQG ZKLFK ,
believe within a few years will occupy a great position in the world of 
commerce and manufactures. Where I went in the East I found it was 
engaging the attention of the most intelligent and far-seeing men, and I saw 
and heard so much that if I were the head of a great manufacturing firm I 
would at once set aside 50,000 to 100,000 yards to thoroughly test the 
capabilities both of the Eastern production and British manufacture of their 
PRVWSURPLVLQJILEUH´10 
 
4.4 Strategic Repositioning and Capabilities between 1919-1939 and 1945-1970 
The examination of selected case studies suggests that firms responded to the growing 
international competition during the two periods 1919-1939 (Period 2) and 1945-1970 
(Period 3) by repositioning themselves strategically through the development of two broad 
sets of capabilities, within jute and with new fibre.  
During period 2, the competition from the Indian industry was limited to the 
µVWDQGDUG¶VDFNDQGEDJPDUNHWDQGQDUURZZLGWKFORWK7KHH[DPLQDWLRQRI%XLVWDQG-,
during this period indicates that these firms had consciously decided to move away from 
the areas where Indian competition was getting intense. The case of JI indicated that, in 
weaving, firms built capabilities in wide-width, lighter weight and long rolls of cloth. These 
                                                 
10 Dundee Advertiser, 8th April 1896 
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were used mainly as backing cloth for linoleum. On the other hand, the case of Buist 
suggested that, in spinning, this corresponded to capability in medium and fine qualities of 
yarn for carpet yarns and yarns for lighter weight jute cloth that were being developed by 
weaving firms. Therefore, during this period, the repositioning was limited to entering new 
markets by developing further capabilities in jute. But this strategy was limited to only a 
few firms, while others stuck to their capability in narrow-width cloth and continued to 
operate in the traditional markets.  
However, during period 3, a two-pronged repositioning strategy and capability 
development strategy was followed in both jute and new fibre. Up to the 1950s, a large part 
of the industry that had continued to operate in the traditional sack and bag market during 
the period 2, began to specialise and enter new markets. For example, S&F, after operating 
in the traditional narrow-width sack and bag market during this time, began to build its 
capability in the 1950s in wide-widths and long lengths. On the other hand, firms that had 
already specialised during period 2, found new product applications. For example, JI was 
one of the few firms that had already built a substantial capability in wide-width cloth that 
was used as a backing cloth for linoleum (a floor covering) by the end of period 2. During 
the 1950s, JI leveraged its capability in wide-width to develop carpet backing cloth. 
Besides specialisation in jute, firms also began to introduce new fibres during the period 3. 
For example, Craiks introduced cotton immediately after the end of the Second World War 
and, by the 1950s, half of its production was in cotton and synthetics. JI also made such 
strategic forays, with the establishment of paper sack and bags manufacture. However, 
until the second-half of 1960s, the new fibres were not adopted widely within the industry 
though they grew dramatically thereafter.  
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The general strategy of repositioning into new markets and the importance of 
capability in wider widths and finer yarns is also supported by Whately (1992), in his 
company history of the firm Don Brother Buist Ltd. Whatley found that during period 2, 
RZLQJWRJURZLQJFRPSHWLWLRQIURPWKH,QGLDQLQGXVWU\LQWKHµVWDQGDUGJRRGV¶LHVDFNV
DQGEDJV'RQVZHUHµYHU\PXFKLQWKHIRUHIURQWRIWKHVHDUFKIRUPDUNHWVIRUQRQ-standard 
JRRGV¶S7KHPDMRULW\RIWKHILUP¶VORRPVDWWKLVPRPHQWZHUHLQQDUURZ-widths 
WKDWZHUHIRXQGWREHµWRRQDUURZIRUWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\PDUNHW¶S,QWKHLUHIIRUWWR
enter into specialised markets, Dons went on to build their capability in medium and wide 
ZLGWKVXSWR´E\WKHPLG-1930s (p. 181). During period 3 Dons were able to leverage 
these capabilities further (p. 196). However, as illustrated in the next section, the 
development of new capabilities in jute and new fibres was constrained by certain critical 
barriers.  
 
4.5 Barriers to Strategic Repositioning and Capability Development 
A major aspect of this research is to identify factors that played a part in a particular 
capability option that was not adopted. The jute industry faced options in developing 
capability within jute and for new fibres. The importance of these options was prominent 
during two key phases, period 1 and 3. An exploration of the factors that led the industry 
to develop its capability within jute, rather than new fibre, in period 1 and 2, and vice versa 
in period 3, will help to illustrate the contextual barriers that firms faced.  
 
4.5.1 Period 1 and 2(1880s-1945) 
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This is the first period when strategic capability options were created in order to counter 
growing international competition. Between the two alternatives, jute and new fibre, firms 
concentrated their efforts on developing capabilities in the former until 1945.  
Trials conducted with new fibres, especially with Ramie, between 1880s and 1890s 
highlight two major factors that acted as barriers in building capability in this area. The 
first was the unsuitability of new fibres to existing jute machineries and required new 
machinery and processing techniques. However, with some modifications to the machines, 
the fibre could be manufactured to a satisfactory quality.  
Second, it transpired that the cost of manufacturing this fibre was higher than that 
of jute. Between the two, the second issue had a greater implication then the first one. It is 
LPSRUWDQWWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHLQGXVWU\¶VFRQFHUQIRUSULFHVHQVLWLYLW\ZKHQLQWURGXFLQJQHZ
fibres. The cheapness of jute was one of the major factors in its substitution of flax. 
Therefore, the matter of cost would be a major issue if a new fibre was to replace jute. 
Furthermore, jute had been able to maintain its dominance in the world markets due to its 
cheapness.  
During the period 2, the industry was unable to find a cheaper fibre than jute. For 
H[DPSOHZKHQDVDPSOHZDVVHQWWR-,LQLWV'LUHFWRUWHUPHGWKHILEUHDVEHLQJµWRR
JRRG¶IRUWKHP$VDUHVXOWILUPVFRQWLQXHGWREXLOGWKHLUFDSDELOLW\LQMXWHDVSDUWRIWKH
strategic response. But the potential of capabilities in jute to counter international 
competition declined dramatically during the period 3 leading to the importance of 
developing capabilities in new fibre, as discussed in the following section.  
 
4.5.2 Period 3 (1945-1970) 
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The second period when the strategic capability options became important within the DJI 
was after 1945. Several forces determined the future pathway: 
 
a) Limitations with the Attributes of Jute 
During period 3, developing further capabilities in jute beyond the recent innovations in 
wide-widths and long lengths proved to be a major challenge. The coarse nature of the fibre 
and cheapness in price were the two most important features that had enabled jute to replace 
flax in Dundee during the Crimean War in the 1850s. But these physical properties meant 
that jute was not accepted widely beyond its traditional markets. For example, in an effort 
to promote the awareness of jute and its uses, the DJI had marketed jute as a versatile fibre, 
having around 101 applications. However, almost all these applications were in the 
industrial market. In these markets, jute had very little competition from other fibres due 
to its durability and cost.  However, its coarseness was a major constraint in entering 
consumer markets, where finer and softer fabrics were needed e.g., wall coverings. 
Recalling the problems faced in carrying out further innovations in jute during the between 
1945 and 1970, Mr McKay, the Head of Research Department at Jute Industries and a 
Research Committee member of the British Jute Trade Research Association11, observed:  
 
³8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKHPHUHQDWXUHRIWKHILEUHOLPLWHGWKHVFRSH,PHDQLILWZDV
exposed to sunlight it would rot away, so from that point of view its durability. 
But on the other side, the fibre itself limited to the extent you could produce 
lighter yarns, because beyond a certain point it is not possible because of the 
                                                 
11 The BJTRA was established in 1947 with an aim to foster research within the Dundee jute industry. It 
was jointly funded by the Government and the industry.  
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coarseness of the fibre- unlike cotton- so you were faced with, relatively 
speaking, bulky yarns because you could not get it down to anything really 
fine. And even had you succeeded in doing that, the applications were fairly 
limited. There is a certain restriction on development because of the nature of 
WKHILEUHLWVHOI´12  
 
However, these limitations were not just prevalent during the 1950s and 60s, but 
SHUVLVW HYHQ WR WKLV GD\ 0U $WNLQVRQ¶V UHIOHFWLRQ RQ WKH RXWFRPH RI PDMRU UHVHDUFK
institutes (including Dundee, India and Bangladesh) gives a startling insight into the 
developments in machinery, processing and the application of jute since the 1950s:   
 
³«\RXKDGWKHMXWHUHVHDUFKLQVWLWXWHZRUNLQJIURPDERXWWLOORU
ZKHQHYHULWIROGHGXS\HDUV$QGQRWKLQJFDPHRXWRILW<RX¶YHJRWWKH
Indian research institute, which has been working longer. Nothing of 
significance has come out<RX¶YHJRWWKH%DQJODGHVKLQVWLWXWHZRUNLQJIURP
1960s into the present being. Nothing has come out of it. Yes all right, minor 
things here and minor things there, little bits and pieces. But there has been 
no wholesale redevelopment of the process. The process today is exactly the 
VDPHDVLWZDVLQWKHV)XQGDPHQWDOO\LW¶VWKHVDPH7KHPDFKLQHVKDYH
FKDQJHG VOLJKWO\ WKH\ DUH JRLQJ D OLWWOH ELW IDVWHU QRZ %XW LW¶V EHHQ
fundamentally the same. There has been no significant change there. And 
equally there has been no market of any size developed, despite about 150 
                                                 
12 Interview with Mr Sandy McKay 
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UHVHDUFK\HDUV ,W¶VUDWKHUVDGEXW , WKLQNLW MXVWPHDQVWKDW MXWHLV LGHDOIRU
VDFNVDQGEDJV)LQLVK)XOOVWRS´13  
 
 By 1939, it seemed that jute had reached the limit of its technological development 
and stood at the top of its S-curve. Physical properties restricted progress severely. With 
the dismantling of protection under the Monopolies Act during the early 1960s, 
international competition again posed a serious challenge. In this context, the importance 
RIDQHZILEUHEHFDPHSDUDPRXQWWRWKHLQGXVWU\¶VVXUYLYDO 
 
b) Significance of New Fibre  
 
While attempts were made to find a new fibre after 1945, these had begun as far back as 
the 1880s-1890s. Surprisingly, by the end of the 1950s, no new fibres were adopted widely 
ZLWKLQ WKH LQGXVWU\ 7KH 3LOPRWW &RPPLWWHH 5HSRUW LQ  RQ WKH µ)XWXUH RI WKH -XWH
,QGXVWU\¶IRXQGWKDW only a handful firms had begun using new alternates. As Table 4 below 
indicates, of the total 57 firms surveyed, 38 firms were wholly dependent on jute. Of the 
remaining, only 9 firms were using synthetic fibres to some extent (largely rayon, with 2 
firms also using nylon), 2 firms were using wool, 1 firm was making paper and felt, 1 firm 
had diversified partly into engineering, 3 firms were engaged in carpet and brattice cloth, 
and 1 firm in flax. Only 1 firm had completely changed over from jute to rayon.   
 
 
                                                 
13 Interview with Mr R R Atkinson  
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Table 4 Number of Firms in Jute and Other Fibres  
 Wholly on Jute Mainly on Jute Jute and Other 
products 
Formerly on 
Jute 
Number of 
firms  
38 8 11 1 
Source: Pilmott Committee Report, 1959 
 
Among the firms that were using new fibres, the majority of them had introduced 
Rayon. Rayon is a fine fibre and has a feel and texture akin to that of cotton, silk linen and 
ZRRO2ZLQJWRLWVILQHQHVV5D\RQLVZLGHO\FDOOHGDQµDUWLILFLDOVLON¶7KHUHIRUHLWZDV
more suitable for the markets where fineness of yarn / cloth was of paramount importance. 
In the cloth side, it was more suited for the apparel and furnishing markets. It was not 
particularly suitable for the traditional jute markets of sacks, bags, and backing cloths 
where the emphasis was on the coarseness of the fibre.  With properties similar to that of 
cotton, it could also be processed on looms such as the Northrop, which was primarily 
made for weaving cotton. The Rayon yarn was more suitable for pile yarns14, which were 
required to have a softer feel. Jute, on the other hand, was used as a weft yarn15, which was 
required to be of tougher build. Consequently, Rayon could not be used to replace jute as 
a weft yarn. Therefore, Rayon was more suitable for firms that had moved away from the 
traditional industrial markets of jute into the apparel and furnishing industry. This could 
explain why, during the period 3, Craiks, who had entered into furnishing market with the 
                                                 
14 Pile Yarn: This yarn, cut or looped, is projected from the substrate and acts as the use-surface. 
15 Weft Yarn: This yarn is laid out horizontally to hold together the entire construction of the carpet.  
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introduction of cotton, laid greater emphasis on Rayon than Scott & Fyfe, who continued 
to operate in the industrial market.  
However, it was not until the introduction of Polypropylene in the mid 1960s that any 
serious replacement for jute was found. This replacement was used in traditional jute 
markets and proved economically viable. Comparing this new fibre with other fibres, the 
industry had tried previously, Dr Stout, Director of Research at Scottish Textiles Research 
Association (formerly BJTRA) noted:  
³:KDW LV WKH IXWXUH" 3RO\SURS\OHQH WDSH LV WKH ILUVW V\QWKHWLF PDWHULDO WR
challenge jute both on technical merit and price. It is likely to be the first of 
many challenges. So research work must keep well ahead of commercial 
GHYHORSPHQW´16  
 
Polypropylene had three major technical advantages over jute in traditional products. 
First, jute was prone to rotting if used in damp conditions. Second, jute being a 
biodegradable fibre, tended to lose its colour and texture if it was exposed to sunlight for 
an extended period of time. Being a synthetic fibre, Polypropylene was able to overcome 
these two limitations of jute.   Third, in the process of making tufted carpets-a primary 
market for jute, the jute primary backing cloth was highly prone to breaking needles that 
were inserted in it. When needles were punched though it, they tend to get brushed aside. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQG3RO\SURS\OHQHIDEULFZDVDQµDFFHSWRU¶RIQHHGOHV$VWKHQHHGOHZDV
punched down, the fabric would spread around it. As a result, the pile was placed much 
closer to where it was intended to be. On the other hand, the fibrous nature of jute provided 
                                                 
16 µ$GGLQJDQRWKHUVWULQJWRWKHWH[WLOHERZ¶1HZVSDSHUFXWWLQJIURP*ODVJRZ+HUDOGth August 1969 
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D EHWWHU µERQG¶ WKDQ SRO\SURS\OHQH IRU WKH EDFNLQJ RI WXIWHG FDUSHW 0F.D\ 
However, in order to overcome this, latexing was introduced to achieve better bonding 
between the Polypropylene backing and the carpet pile. Other aspects such as less waste in 
SURGXFWLRQDQGUHODWLYHVWDELOLW\LQUDZPDWHULDO¶VVXSSO\DQGSULFHVDOVRFRPELQed to make 
Polypropylene an attractive option to jute.  
Besides being technically superior, Polypropylene was also cheaper than jute, at-least 
during the late 1960s. The fluctuation in the price of raw jute in the late 1960s had led to a 
significant price increase in jute goods, making Polypropylene cheaper than jute. The 
Figure 4 shows the dramatic increase in price of jute cloth on the one hand and a fall of 
polypropylene cloth on the other. The relative cheapness of polypropylene played a major 
role in this new fibre being adopted widely by the industry.  
 
Figure 4  Polyproplyne resin, Jute Hessian and Polyproplyne Cloth Equivalent Prices 
1964-74 (actual) 1975 (estimated): McDowell and Draper (1978) 
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As discussed, there were limitations associated with the physical characteristics of 
jute. Therefore, initiating further development work was very difficult, if not impossible 
GXULQJWKHSHULRG7KHµODWHVW¶GHYHORSPHQWLHEDFNLQJFORWKVIRUWXIWHGFDrpets, was 
also under threat from Indian competition, once protection was lifted in the 1960s. The 
LQGXVWU\WKHUHIRUHIDFHGDµVTXHH]H¶ZKHUHE\DWRQHHQGORZFRVWEDVHGFRPSHWLWLRQZDV
looming and at the other end, the limiting properties of jute imposed further capability 
development constraints.  
Under these circumstances, the introduction of a new fibre was viewed within the 
industry as a possible strategic option. If a new fibre could have been applied in the existing 
industrial market, it would have given the industry a chance to move away from the Indian 
LQGXVWU\¶VMXWH-based competition. Therefore, the replacement of jute by a new fibre should 
QRWEHYLHZHGDVDµWKUHDW¶RUµGHDWKNQHOO¶IRUWKHµMXWH¶LQGXVWU\EXWDQHFHVVLW\WKURXJK
which the DunGHHµWH[WLOH¶LQGXVWU\FRXOGFRQWLQXHWRVXUYLYH*XOGLHVXSSRUWVWKLV
notion and has drawn a parallel between the introduction of jute and Polypropylene and 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWµWKHFRPLQJRIMXWHZDVDVLQHYLWDEOHDVWKHUHSODFHPHQWE\3RO\SURS\OHQH¶
(p. 125).  
 
Why did it take the industry until the 1960s to introduce it? An initial analysis points 
WRERWKSK\VLFDODQGFRJQLWLYHµORFNLQ¶HIIHFWV7KHSK\VLFDOSURSHUWLHVRIWKHILEUHDQGLWV
relative cost advantage restricted its use to industrial markets in the main. The 
characteristics of jute limited further developments within jute, which meant that it was 
difficult to apply it to other more lucrative global markets e.g., consumer goods.  In 
addition, the relative cheapness of jute meant that it was tough to find another fibre to 
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match the commercial and technological qualities of jute to replace it in the traditional 
markets. The second explanation is cognitive. MacKay, Masrani and McKiernan (2006) 
KDYHDUJXHGWKDWDµMXWH¶PHQWDOLW\GRPLQDWHGWKLQNing within the sector. Its intensity and 
symbolism were reflected and reinforced in local committees, institutes, supply chains, 
press and research papers. For instance, since the introduction of jute in 1850s, the industry 
was widely known by its supply sLGHUDZPDWHULDODVWKHµ'XQGHH-XWH,QGXVWU\¶UDWKHU
than by demand side customers it served in the industrial markets e.g., the packaging 
industry. As a result, the innovations, both products and process, were mainly within jute 
(p. 935-936). Had the iQGXVWU\SHUFHLYHG LWVHOI DVD µSDFNDJLQJ¶ LQGXVWU\ LW FRXOGKDYH
avoided locking itself into jute only innovations and could have been more vigorous in its 
search for new fibres (p. 936). These two explanations are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In fact, it is also possible that the cheapness of jute and the inability to find any 
RWKHUILEUHWRUHSODFHLWFRXOGKDYHOHGWRWKHEHOLHIZLWKLQWKHLQGXVWU\WKDWµMXWHLVNLQJ¶
and is irreplaceable.   
 
 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
This study has made an attempt to address the three major problems associated with path 
dependency in the capabilities literature: a) it examined the strategic options and reasons 
why some options were selected over others. b) it gave emphasis to the on-going flux and 
crisis in selecting the capability alternatives and; c) it queried the predominant belief that 
the capabilities actually developed formed the most efficient strategy. 
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Clearly, the pattern of capability development in the DJI during period 2 and 3 that 
was generated to counter growing international competition can be explained by the 
traditional path dependency related aspects such as technological interrelatedness. For 
example, firms developed capabilities in jute wide-width cloth and jute finer yarns by 
making use of their existing capabilities in jute. But assuming that, because of 
technological relatedness, the further development of capabilities within jute was the only 
option considered by the firms within the industry would be incorrect. As this study has 
found, the firms also considered the possibility of developing capability in a new fibre (the 
Road Less Traveled) as early as the 1880s and again after the end of the Second World 
War. Nonetheless, the inability to find a fibre with technological and commercial viability 
to replace jute in its traditional markets played a major role in selecting the jute capability 
development option over the new fibre option. But when firms were able to develop 
capability in a new fibre, as with Polypropylene, the significance of developing capability 
in jute declined dramatically. This study made an attempt not to limit the examination to a 
single event or turning point as a dominant factor in influencing capability development. 
As a result, the findings of the study have been able to illuminate the constant flux and 
dilemmas pertaining to the selection of strategic capability options. Yet, it is evident from 
the case study that, in the long term, the further development of capabilities within jute was 
not the most efficient option in order to counter growing international competition. 
Though, it offered some support in the medium term, this became tough to sustain and the 
DJI collapsed finally during the 1980s.   
This chapter has argued that the attribution of the development of a particular 
capability only to path dependency and its determinant factors such as technological 
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interrelatedness does not lead to a full understanding of the historical context within which 
the capabilities are developed. Such myopia robs the analysis of knowledge of the range of 
options available to a firm and an opportunity to gain deeper understanding as to why a 
particular capability was pursued over others. This can be addressed by following a two 
pronged strategy: first, through the identification of strategic capability development 
options that were being considered by the firm before committing to a particular capability 
and second, through the juxtaposition of alternatives and the examination of the reasons 
why certain alternatives were discarded. In particular, an investigation of the role of factors 
other than those traditionally related to path dependency would shed fresh light on the 
issue. In this context, the role of agency in influencing the rejection, or selection, of 
particular capability development option offers a possible avenue for future research. The 
capabilities literature should make, and note, the greater concentrated attempt to engage 
with history. This chapter made a concerted attempt to engage with history within the 
strategy literature illustrating that there is a great scope for the use of historicist 
methodology to gain a better understanding of firm strategies.  
The findings of this study have several implications for research on foresight. First, 
sectors exhibit a patterning throughout history whose signatures are repeated in the present. 
7KHVHFDVHVWXGLHVLOOXVWUDWHWKDWµQRWPXFKLVQHZ¶LQVWUDWHJLFWHUPVLQPRGHUQLQGXVWULHV
that was not replicated at some stage in past sectors. For example, the events and crises in 
the DJI and have a parallel in history of the UK Cotton Industry (for example, see Rose 
1990; Singleton 1991) and can be witnessed in any study of UK car production from 1945 
to 1985. Hence, a methodical study of firm and industry histories can help to put the present 
and future into context. Second, firms can confuse a path dependent option with a best way 
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IRUZDUG &RJQLWLYH IUHH]LQJ FRXSOHG ZLWK DVVHW VSHFLILFLW\ FDQ FDXVH µORFN LQ¶ DQG DQ
ignorance of other options in the set which may have more sustainable future pathways. In 
practice, these might be left under-H[SORUHG DQG WKXV SUHVHQWHG DV µVWUDZ¶ RSWLRQV LQ
FRPSDULVRQWRWKHµORFNHG¶YHUVLRQ&RQVHTXHQWO\GXHGLOLJHQFHLVGDPDJHGDQGIRUHsight 
restricted. Finally, as this study has indicated, components of strategy, which may appear 
to be less suitable in the present, could very well become an integral part of the future. The 
fuller exploration of capability options can benefit from techniques of scenario modelling. 
This will assist in the systematic appraisal of their future planning and may lead to a more 
informed choice.  
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